About Me
I am an assistant professor in the Department of Finance at the CUHK Business School. I recently received my PhD in economics from MIT. I am interested in how financial frictions and liquidity provision affect firms’ real decisions, with an emphasis on credit supply channels and intermediary behavior. I have a particular interest in environmental settings.
Research
Factoring
with Victor Orestes and Thiago Silva PDF
Selected presentations: Finance Down Under, BU*, MFA, Spring Finance Workshop, FIRS, Lake District Workshop, CEBRA, EEA*. Upcoming: IBEFA (ASSA)*. (* presented by co-author)
Abstract: We study the firm-level and aggregate effects of factoring, the sale of accounts receivable to banks and nonbank intermediaries, using economy-wide invoice, payment, credit-registry, fund, and employer-employee data from Brazil. Factoring is the main source of intermediated working-capital credit, especially for smaller and riskier firms. Specialized securitized receivables funds (FIDCs) grew from about 10 percent of recourse factoring before 2020 to 30–45 percent in 2021–2024. Instrumenting each firm’s factoring interest rate with institutional investor flows into FIDCs, we show that more exposed firms have factoring rates at both FIDCs and competing banks. Lower rates expand factoring volume without displacing bank credit, reduce default on factored receivables, and raise firm revenue, input purchases, and permanent employment. We interpret these responses in a general equilibrium model with competitive intermediaries that have limited capital and face rising verification costs beyond each seller’s baseline pledgeable share. In the calibrated model, the scarcity premium on fund capital accounts for 3 percentage points of the 22 percent average factoring rate, and verification costs account for 6. Eliminating the scarcity premium would raise aggregate output by less than 0.1 percent, while lowering verification costs enough to expand factoring volume from 8 to 10 percent of GDP would increase output by 3.6 percent.
Volatility and Under-Insurance in Economies with Limited Pledgeability: Evidence from a Frost Shock
with Victor Orestes and Thiago Silva PDF
Selected presentations: LSE Environment Camp, CEBRA, AsianFA.
Abstract: How does limited pledgeability affect risk management and financing decisions after physical climate shocks? We show that collateral constraints explain why firms are under-hedged before shocks despite subsidized insurance, and why credit is least available afterward to the firms with the largest losses. In our dynamic limited-commitment model, insurance uses debt capacity that would otherwise finance production ex ante, but insurance and credit are complementary ex post because insurance preserves net worth. When credit is backed by output and capital, the equilibrium price response to a shock reallocates borrowing capacity to firms whose productive assets survive the shock. We test this mechanism using administrative microdata linking bank credit, interfirm payments, and crop insurance for farmers around Brazil’s July 2021 frost. Coffee trees are productive capital, valued along with the land underneath as collateral, so the frost was a shock to both cash flow and pledgeable value. Although federal subsidies covered 40% of coffee insurance premiums in 2021, only 20% of coffee farmers in our data were insured. After two years, each percentage point of damage is associated with 1.3% less debt and 0.38% lower payments to upstream input suppliers among uninsured farmers, and with 0.24% higher input payments among insured farmers. Interest rates and bank defaults did not respond significantly. Debt adjustment occurred through credit quantities and maturity. Our model explains why disaster recovery lending secured by the same collateral did not substitute for insurance, with the policy takeaway that climate stress tests linking bank losses to resilience mis-measure who bears the risk.
Carbon Market Design and Financing Clean Production
with Luis Alvarez, Victor Orestes, and Thiago Silva
Selected presentations: VU Amsterdam, SKEMA.
Abstract: Carbon credit markets reward cleaner production with a tradable asset. Financing frictions can create a wedge between a carbon credit’s market price and its value to a green producer or a brown firm facing compliance obligations. We study Brazil’s RenovaBio program, where biofuel producers issue carbon credits (CBIOs) and fuel distributors must retire CBIOs to comply. Using Central Bank of Brazil custody records from April 2020 to July 2026, we show that producers and distributors hold almost all CBIOs and outside investors hold very few. Distributor holdings follow the compliance calendar. Producers’ average holding share rose from 26 percent in 2022 to 66 percent in 2025. We develop a dynamic model in which financially constrained producers choose investment and CBIO sales, while distributors bank CBIOs for future compliance. Producers with tighter financing sell earlier, and a higher CBIO value at issuance raises the return to investment in clean capacity. A constrained producer discounts future CBIO receipts at more than the market rate and can borrow against at most part of their value. The impact of an emissions target on investment depends on when producers are paid, whether producers can borrow against current or future CBIOs, and the timing and enforcement of compliance
Aggregate Impacts of Command-and-Control Environmental Policy: Evidence from Court-Ordered Mining Bans in India
with Ananya Kotia and Utkarsh Saxena
Abstract: We estimate the aggregate impacts of court-ordered iron ore mining bans in India and consider the counterfactual welfare gains from an alternative policy to the ban. The local sectoral ban is a command-and-control (CAC) policy that is commonly applied to natural resource settings, usually when the regulator has a signal of widespread non-compliance. The Supreme Court of India imposed bans on iron ore mining and outbound iron ore trade in two states in response to reports that mines operated under fake environmental permits and underpaid mining royalties. Using firm-level industrial survey data, mine-level output data, and bilateral mine-to-firm auction data, we decompose the bans’ effects into trade, production networks, and local labor demand channels. Our results indicate persistent declines in employment, capital stock, and borrowing by iron-consuming plants, despite the temporary duration of the ban. These findings highlight the economic spillovers caused by CAC policies, especially in industries that are upstream in the supply chain.