About Me
I am an assistant professor in the Department of Finance at the CUHK Business School. I recently received my PhD in economics from MIT. I am interested in how financial frictions and liquidity provision affect firms’ real decisions, with an emphasis on credit supply channels and intermediary behavior. I have a particular interest in environmental settings.
Research
Factoring
with Victor Orestes and Thiago Silva PDF
Selected presentations: Finance Down Under, BU*, MFA, Spring Finance Workshop, FIRS, Lake District Workshop, CEBRA, EEA*. Upcoming: IBEFA (ASSA)*. (* presented by co-author)
Abstract: We study the firm-level and aggregate effects of factoring, the sale of accounts receivable to banks and nonbank intermediaries, using economy-wide invoice, payment, credit-registry, fund, and employer-employee data from Brazil. Factoring is the main source of intermediated working-capital credit, especially for smaller and riskier firms. Specialized securitized receivables funds (FIDCs) grew from about 10 percent of recourse factoring before 2020 to 30–45 percent in 2021–2024. Instrumenting each firm’s factoring interest rate with institutional investor flows into FIDCs, we show that more exposed firms have factoring rates at both FIDCs and competing banks. Lower rates expand factoring volume without displacing bank credit, reduce default on factored receivables, and raise firm revenue, input purchases, and permanent employment. We interpret these responses in a general equilibrium model with competitive intermediaries that have limited capital and face rising verification costs beyond each seller’s baseline pledgeable share. In the calibrated model, the scarcity premium on fund capital accounts for 3 percentage points of the 22 percent average factoring rate, and verification costs account for 6. Eliminating the scarcity premium would raise aggregate output by less than 0.1 percent, while lowering verification costs enough to expand factoring volume from 8 to 10 percent of GDP would increase output by 3.6 percent.
Volatility and Under-Insurance in Economies with Limited Pledgeability: Evidence from a Frost Shock
with Victor Orestes and Thiago Silva PDF
Selected presentations: LSE Environment Camp, CEBRA, AsianFA.
Abstract: We show that when productive assets serve as collateral, firms under-insure before shocks. In our model, insurance uses debt capacity that would otherwise finance production ex ante, while payouts preserve net worth ex post. Higher output prices from aggregate losses let firms with surviving assets earn and borrow more, leading to a wider distribution of output and financing demand. We test these predictions around Brazil’s July 2021 frost using linked microdata on bank credit, interfirm payments, and crop insurance. Only 20% of coffee farmers were insured despite a 40% federal premium subsidy on eligible private policies. Two years after the frost, each percentage point of measured damage led to 1.3% less debt among uninsured farmers. Payments to input suppliers decreased with damage among uninsured farmers and rose among insured farmers. Debt maturity increased on impact for uninsured borrowers, with no significant response in interest rates or defaults in either group. Our quantification implies that recovery credit backed by damaged collateral substitutes poorly for insurance, and climate stress tests based on bank losses miss the costs borne by uninsured farmers
Carbon Market Design and Financing Clean Production
with Luis Alvarez, Victor Orestes, and Thiago Silva
Selected presentations: VU Amsterdam, SKEMA.
Abstract: Carbon credit markets reward cleaner production with a tradable asset. Financing frictions can create a wedge between a carbon credit’s market price and its value to a green producer or a brown firm facing compliance obligations. We study Brazil’s RenovaBio program, where biofuel producers issue carbon credits (CBIOs) and fuel distributors must retire CBIOs to comply. Using Central Bank of Brazil custody records from April 2020 to July 2026, we show that producers and distributors hold almost all CBIOs and outside investors hold very few. Distributor holdings follow the compliance calendar. Producers’ average holding share rose from 26 percent in 2022 to 66 percent in 2025. We develop a dynamic model in which financially constrained producers choose investment and CBIO sales, while distributors bank CBIOs for future compliance. Producers with tighter financing sell earlier, and a higher CBIO value at issuance raises the return to investment in clean capacity. A constrained producer discounts future CBIO receipts at more than the market rate and can borrow against at most part of their value. The impact of an emissions target on investment depends on when producers are paid, whether producers can borrow against current or future CBIOs, and the timing and enforcement of compliance
Aggregate Impacts of Command-and-Control Environmental Policy: Evidence from Court-Ordered Mining Bans in India
with Ananya Kotia and Utkarsh Saxena
Abstract: We estimate the aggregate impacts of court-ordered iron ore mining bans in India and consider the counterfactual welfare gains from an alternative policy to the ban. The local sectoral ban is a command-and-control (CAC) policy that is commonly applied to natural resource settings, usually when the regulator has a signal of widespread non-compliance. The Supreme Court of India imposed bans on iron ore mining and outbound iron ore trade in two states in response to reports that mines operated under fake environmental permits and underpaid mining royalties. Using firm-level industrial survey data, mine-level output data, and bilateral mine-to-firm auction data, we decompose the bans’ effects into trade, production networks, and local labor demand channels. Our results indicate persistent declines in employment, capital stock, and borrowing by iron-consuming plants, despite the temporary duration of the ban. These findings highlight the economic spillovers caused by CAC policies, especially in industries that are upstream in the supply chain.