About Me

I am an assistant professor in the Department of Finance at the CUHK Business School. I recently received my PhD in economics from MIT. I am interested in how financial frictions and liquidity provision affect firms’ real decisions, with an emphasis on credit supply channels and intermediary behavior. I have a particular interest in environmental settings.

Research

Factoring

with Victor Orestes and Thiago Silva   PDF

Selected presentations: Finance Down Under, BU*, MFA, Spring Finance Workshop, FIRS, Lake District Workshop, CEBRA, EEA*. Upcoming: IBEFA (ASSA)*. (* presented by co-author)

Abstract: How important is factoring for working capital, and how do changes in factoring supply and receivables infrastructure affect firms and aggregate output? We study factoring in Brazil, with rich data on registered invoices (boletos) and competition between securitized receivables funds (FIDCs) and banks. Linking transaction-level invoices, payments, credit-registry, credit-score, fund, and employer-employee data, we show that factoring is the main source of intermediated working-capital credit, especially for smaller, riskier firms. We instrument firm factoring rates using predetermined exposure to investor flows into FIDCs, which fund 30 to 45 percent of recourse factoring. A one-standard-deviation inflow shock cuts factoring rates by 12.1 basis points. Per one-percentage-point rate cut, factoring rises by 16.9 log points without displacing credit lines or long-term debt, revenue rises by 6.1 log points (2.7 at eight months), intermediate inputs rise by 3.6 log points (1.2 at eight months), factoring default declines, and firms shift from temporary contracts (-1.81 log points on impact) to permanent hires (+1.14 log points through month eight). We interpret these estimates in a general equilibrium model with cash-flow timing, buyer default risk, payments clearing, and a microfounded intermediary supply schedule with convex certification costs above each seller’s baseline pledgeable share. Calibration decomposes the 22.3 percent average factoring rate into funding cost (6.9 percent), default risk (5.9 percent), certification cost (6.2 percent), and fund markup (3.3 percent). Since the fund markup is only 15 percent of factoring cost, eliminating it takes roughly 5 percent more intermediary capital and lifts aggregate output by under 0.1 percent, with smaller gains once bank lines and internal funds are added.

Volatility and Under-Insurance in Economies with Limited Pledgeability: Evidence from a Frost Shock

with Victor Orestes and Thiago Silva   PDF

Selected presentations: LSE Environment Camp, CEBRA, AsianFA.

Abstract: How does limited pledgeability affect risk management and financing decisions after physical climate shocks? We show that collateral constraints explain why firms are under-hedged before shocks despite subsidized insurance, and why credit is least available afterward to the firms with the largest losses. In our dynamic limited-commitment model, insurance uses debt capacity that would otherwise finance production ex ante, but insurance and credit are complementary ex post because insurance preserves net worth. When credit is backed by output and capital, the equilibrium price response to a shock reallocates borrowing capacity to firms whose productive assets survive the shock. We test this mechanism using administrative microdata linking bank credit, interfirm payments, and crop insurance for farmers around Brazil’s July 2021 frost. Coffee trees are productive capital, valued along with the land underneath as collateral, so the frost was a shock to both cash flow and pledgeable value. Although federal subsidies covered 40% of coffee insurance premiums in 2021, only 20% of coffee farmers in our data were insured. After two years, each percentage point of damage is associated with 1.3% less debt and 0.38% lower payments to upstream input suppliers among uninsured farmers, and with 0.24% higher input payments among insured farmers. Interest rates and bank defaults did not respond significantly. Debt adjustment occurred through credit quantities and maturity. Our model explains why disaster recovery lending secured by the same collateral did not substitute for insurance, with the policy takeaway that climate stress tests linking bank losses to resilience mis-measure who bears the risk.

Carbon Market Design and Financing Clean Production

with Luis Alvarez, Victor Orestes, and Thiago Silva

Selected presentations: VU Amsterdam, SKEMA.

Abstract: Carbon credit markets reward cleaner production with a tradable asset. Financing frictions can create a wedge between a carbon credit’s market price and its value to a green producer or a brown firm facing compliance obligations. We study Brazil’s RenovaBio program, where biofuel producers issue carbon credits (CBIOs) and fuel distributors must retire CBIOs to comply. Using Central Bank of Brazil custody records from April 2020 to July 2026, we show that producers and distributors hold almost all CBIOs and outside investors hold very few. Distributor holdings follow the compliance calendar. Producers’ average holding share rose from 26 percent in 2022 to 66 percent in 2025. We develop a dynamic model in which financially constrained producers choose investment and CBIO sales, while distributors bank CBIOs for future compliance. Producers with tighter financing sell earlier, and a higher CBIO value at issuance raises the return to investment in clean capacity. A constrained producer discounts future CBIO receipts at more than the market rate and can borrow against at most part of their value. The impact of an emissions target on investment depends on when producers are paid, whether producers can borrow against current or future CBIOs, and the timing and enforcement of compliance

Aggregate Impacts of Command-and-Control Environmental Policy: Evidence from Court-Ordered Mining Bans in India

with Ananya Kotia and Utkarsh Saxena  

Abstract: We estimate the aggregate impacts of court-ordered iron ore mining bans in India and consider the counterfactual welfare gains from an alternative policy to the ban. The local sectoral ban is a command-and-control (CAC) policy that is commonly applied to natural resource settings, usually when the regulator has a signal of widespread non-compliance. The Supreme Court of India imposed bans on iron ore mining and outbound iron ore trade in two states in response to reports that mines operated under fake environmental permits and underpaid mining royalties. Using firm-level industrial survey data, mine-level output data, and bilateral mine-to-firm auction data, we decompose the bans’ effects into trade, production networks, and local labor demand channels. Our results indicate persistent declines in employment, capital stock, and borrowing by iron-consuming plants, despite the temporary duration of the ban. These findings highlight the economic spillovers caused by CAC policies, especially in industries that are upstream in the supply chain.